

Crisis/briery

Committee:

Find out

Hidden history of the recent
past danger to hearing.

- Hidden Crisis?

- How close were we - when - to miss?

- to sudden "retaliation"?

- to alerts?

- Accidents, + near-accidents?

- Invasion plans: Cuba, 1961-62 (after?)

Crisis/bering
Countries:

Find out

- Nuclear Crisis?

- How close were we - when - to nukes?

- to sudden "retaliation"?

- to shuts?

- Accidents + near-accidents?

- Invasion plan Cuba, 1961-62 (after?)

With history of the recent
past danger to humanity

Stevenson - Sec 10/31/62

Sec Amb told O. J. Hunt

Order from K to dismantle received between 1 and 3 pm.
Started dismantling by at 5 on Sunday. Will be all over
it latest by Friday, when we will have finished
bulldozing of sites. Even the pads will be gone, but
no Cuban observation of the dismantling is permitted.

As to aircraft, Russians assured them that Cubans had
not been trained to fly them. Any equipment, low-
will go. All the A-4, both SAM + conventional, is owned by
Cubans. It was a Cuban school that shot down our plane.

Castro is frustrated, intense, psychotic.

Package please by off the recon till Friday. After that you
will find they have bulldozed all of the sites.

11/1/62 Bell - Sec. Castro talked as though he had all the sites
aircraft and he did boast that it was the Cubans who had

Analyze K's proposals on Turkey in light of bargaining theory: emphasis on symmetry of "right," based on "equal" threat capability. (e.g. 27 Oct).

If Castro persuaded SAM detachment commander to shoot U-2 — which needed work as Oct 27 letter being studied — this comes pretty close to catalytic action (or, peculiar sort of "unauthorized" action).

Or could it have been accident? 20 SAMs activated?

No mention of SAM activation 27 Oct.

Consequences

Incidents?

- 1) Shutdown of U-2 Oct 27?
- 2) Activation of SU by U-2, Oct 27?
- 3) SU cable-setting transfer?
- 4) SU Cosmos debris?

Let down Major Anderson. Polke himself is not at all
persuaded that this was ^{not} just only boastfulness on his
part.

He feels that there is a state of very definite kind of
hysteria down there at the moment; that they are probably
going to be looking for flights today and that they are going
to throw everything that they have. After Castro makes his speech
he thinks that if we could delay until tomorrow that the
chances of getting into any real trouble are considerably diminished,
particularly if we change the flight patterns.

(Mike didn't want to have to invite Govin, didn't want Dallas... SN)

He said on a Security Council meeting that Castro would let him
to hold the meeting off till after the 6th.

See: Why the 6th!

Ball: Why, conclusions.

Ball telegrams: Stevenson, Ball, on

Cuba shutdown of U-2

McN - also low-level U-2

Nov 1

Cuba II

Note: early instincts to let "crisis" pass were

quickly discarded -

(State: B. Ball, McN: Cleveland

Defang's Plan, Stevenson ... McN, Hall,

Taylor...)

even faster than surprise attack.

Key elements in SU draw-back:

PFK { 1. Ultimatum
discarded: { 2. Inquiry
 { 3. If with U-2 shot down

+ Cuba shutdown!

Analyze K's proposals in light of bargaining theory: implies an asymmetry of "right," based on "equal" threat capability. (e.g. 27 Oct).

If Castro persuaded SAM detachment commander to shoot U-2 — which needed work as Oct 27 letter being studied — this comes pretty close to catalytic action (or, perhaps sort of "unauthorized" action).

Or could it have been accident? as SAMs activated?

No mention ^{by} of SAM activation 27 Oct.

Converges
'incidents'?

- 1) Shutdown of U-2 Oct 27?
- 2) Detention of SU by U-2, Oct 27?
- 3) SU cable setting transfer?
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- Invasion plan: Cuba, 1961-62 (after?)

Hidden history of the recent
past dangerous to knowing

Ross

Bob Munson ORR

Arach Bush OSI (e.g. on "insurgents" attacks on 26 Oct)

Mr. Skippy Burdick OSI

15 Jan 63 CB

24 March Castro

NSA Frank Allen 13-5334 ^{same}

28 Oct 10 different Frinterks hit up on U-2 flight 27 Oct;
only 1 earlier, 19 Oct. This didn't happen later.

Also, multi-channel comm channel, air defense, Russian, on 27 Oct.

14 April 64 On night of 26 Oct 62 an "attack" on an unidentified base

camp was in progress. The nationality of the attacking forces was

not national. This attack was possibly directed against the

Los Angeles SAM site adjacent to the Bases site and believed
(Bases commander)

to be in direct comm. with them. During this time, M informed

X at Santiago de Cuba that he was "advancing" with his unit.

Later M indicated that these persons may have "killed" during his "advance"

and that 15 others were wounded. Subsequent discussions indicated

national requirements for surgeons and the dispatch of senior doctors

M ultimately requested that a report of the whole affair be sent to

[Timing?]

(~~at the~~)

Vf a later conversation revealed he was to report to Van person the following

morning. The US recon mission was shot down the morning after [?] the

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Arach Bush OSI (e.g. on "insurgents" attacks on 26 Oct)

Mrs. Betty Burdick OSI

15 Jan 63 CIB

28 ~~Mexico~~ Castro

NSA ^{name} Frank Allen 13-5334

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Also, multi-channel comm channel; air defense, Russian, on 27 Oct.

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camp was in progress. The nationality of the attacking forces was
not mentioned. This attack was possibly directed against the

Los Angeles SSF site adjacent to the Banco site and believed
to be in direct comm. with them. During this time, ^(Banco commander) M informed

X at Santiago de Cuba that he was "advancing" with his unit.

Later M indicated that three persons may have "died" during his "advance"
and that 15 others were wounded. Subsequent discussions indicated
mentioned requirements for surgeons and the dispatch of senior doctors

[Timing?] M ultimately suggested that a report of the whole affair be sent to
V^o a later conversation revealed he was to report to Vin person the following
morning. The US recon mission was shot down the morning after [?] the

incident, known by the Los Angeles City

V - Col. H. H. Davidson, Station, Donnellman, prob. SAC commander. Tell
departure 31 Aug 63

14. "I have a suspicion that there has been an attack" ... and
my remarks were short and unconvincing. ... and that he was "advancing" with his master. Later,
Mr. T. E. L. indicated 3 persons may have been during his absence, but
others remained. ... [other circumstances?] V wanted to report to him in person.
"Concerning" - "at what time?"

[What, in Case?]

~~What, in Case?~~

(This attack was not a mere minor incident, but a thing which would
become a major "advancing" ... and he later took
this attack very seriously, but not without some slight delay by
many. What indications were held at all? That business was
taken? (24 notes) When was important threat reported to T. ... report
on Castro surrounding a state with troops?

1967+ SU Postures

a) Deterrence + minimum pre-emption
capability (includes current
estimates for 1962-67). 3 types.

b) Deterrence + war-fighting capability;
credibility based on parity,
imitation of US. [e] implies SU
with 500+ missiles less than US]

c) Deterrence based on highly protected
regions, defenses + hardening + big
warhead; deters by capability to inflict
damage.

Assumes: 1) Deterrence primary 2) some
duty to blunt, secondary, 3) instant
capability vs. Gennavia; 4) ^{no attempt to have} ~~second first strike~~
cap. 2. 1st strike.

41
16
246
41
676

30
E7: 650 MARM/IRBM

US: 620 B-52, 585 B-47.

63: 22~ weapons } allent
4441 MT

64: 26~ weapons
54~ MT

800 MT
500 infrared MM (AF: 800 MM
1150 infrared MM)

No Skybolts. No RS-70. No Regulars.
By PACCS; DUCC for SAC (5 NRARP?)
to Polaris (up to 41: 656 minutes)

I have come to conclusion USAF wants
a first-strike capability. Quote: "long
capability to make first strike credible;
in light of the circumstances &
alternatives." Unflexible; SC may
retain capability (sales) for 50 million

fatalities. "I do not call 50000 fatalities
acceptable." [No mention of Europe]

[McN takes risk of that now, if he
carries out Am. Action/Berlin threat.

Does he want to say: No longer plan to
ref. on umbrella over Europe in 1967?]

"My system provides more incentives
for SC to avoid attack on US or
allies." [Should say: USAF system

is not 12-billion worth better than
McN's, as a "first-strike system."]

[Either explain that McN means to
shift current objectives, in 65; or,
shut up on subject.]

1964's hardening. A-MRB7 now;

AICOM in 65? 100 SCB72 now.

1967+ SU Postures

a) Deterrence + minimum pre-emption
credibility (includes current
estimate for 1962-67). 3 types

b) Deterrence + war-fighting capability;
credibility based on parity,
imitation of US. [e] implies SU
with 500+ missiles less than US]

c) Deterrence based on highly protected
system, defenses + hardening + big
warhead; deter by capability to inflict
damage.

Assumes: 1) Deterrence primary 2) none
duty to blunt, secondary, 3) important
capability vs. Europe; 4) good first-strike
cap. 2. 1st 1st strike

30
E7: 650 MARM/192M

US: 620 B-52, 585 B-47.

63: 22~ weapons } about
4441 MT

64: 26~ weapons
54~ MT

800 MT

500 infrared MM (AF. 500 MM)

7150 infrared MM

No Skybolt. No RS-70. No Regulus.

By PACCS; OUCG for SAC. (5 NRACPP)

6 Polaris (up to 41 = 656 minutes)

I have come to conclusion USAF wants
a first-strike capability. Quote: "by
capability to make first strike credible,
in light of the circumstances &
alternatives." Unfeasible; 50 may
retain capability (only) for 50 million

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16
246
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676

fatalities. "I do not call 5000 fatal.
acceptable." [No mention of number]

[McN takes note of that name, if he
carries out Ann Arbor/Berlin threat.

Does he want to say: No longer plan to
ref on umbrella over Europe in 1967?]

"My system provides more incentives
for SO to avoid attack on US or
allies." [Should say: WSAF system

is not 12-billion worth better than
McN's, as a "first-strike system"]

[Either explain that McN means to
shift current objectives, in 65; or,
what up on subject.]

IRCMC handling. A-MRBM now;

AIRCM in 65? 100 SCBM now.